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William Cohoon

Introduction
In 1833, the United States and Russia came to terms on what is
known as the Commercial and Navigation Treaty of 1832, from here
on out referred to as the Treaty of 1832. This became the first trade
agreement between the two countries, thanks to which Russia began
to import vast amounts of cotton and agricultural equipment. In 1911,
the United States abrogated the Treaty of 1832, a result of the Russian
policies regarding emigration and the treatment of Jewish Americans
in Russia. Subsequently, certain Russian nationalists denounced U.S.
as meddling in Imperial Russian affairs, and in a surprising move
proposed the dissolution of the agreement should be endorsed by the
Duma immediately. Russian nationalists believed that the United
States would be negatively affected by the treaty’s abrogation, but not
the Russian Empire. The nationalists further claimed that Jewish
Americans controlled the government of the United States, and
President Howard Taft had succumbed to their pressure.
Previous literature on Russian nationalists deals primarily with
the nationalist’s anti-Semitic stance particularly that of the actual
Russian Nationalist Party; however, what historians have not
discussed are the economic views of the Russian nationalists, as well
as their attempted involvement in international politics. Despite what
appears to be only an anti-Semitic stance in its dealings with the
United States over the Treaty of 1832, this moment provided the
nationalists with an opportunity to propose to the Duma the need for
economic independence from the United States, or a Russia for
5
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Russians. This was done through the proposal of annulment of the
treaty, and an increased duty on all goods originating in the United
States. Yet the Russian textile industry relied heavily on cotton from
the United States, and had the nationalists achieved their economic
policies of creating a ‘tariff war’ with the United States, the Russian
textile industry would have collapsed on the eve of World War I.
The Treaty of 1832 and the Jewish Question
The history of the Treaty of 1832 begins in 1783 when Francis
Dana, the United States Ambassador to Russia, believed negotiations
on a trade agreement with Imperial Russia would soon begin. Despite
his efforts, Dana proved unsuccessful at procuring an arrangement
with Russia. Momentum for a commercial treaty did not return until
the presidency of John Quincy Adams. After the Russo-Turkish War
of 1828 to 1829, when Russia gained territory from Turkey, a change
of heart occurred. This also coincided with Turkey and the United
States coming to terms with the fact that, “American merchants
should have in Turkey the same treatment as those of the most
favored nations.”1 The American Minister to St. Petersburg John
Randolph, in response to the Secretary of State Martin Van Buren,
presented a treaty that mirrored the Turkish agreement to the Russian
administration. Yet Russia did not come to terms with the United
States until James Buchanan was appointed Minister to Russia.2
Buchanan oversaw the arduous process of negotiating with
Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Count Nesselrode. The American
Minister to Russia further spent his time familiarizing himself with
French, a diplomatic language of the time, as well as international
law. This endeavor enabled Minister Buchanan to fully comprehend
the documentation completed by Minister Randolph who, as
1

Issac Morris Schottenstein, “The Abrogation of the Treaty of 1832 Between
the United States and Russia” (master’s thesis, Ohio State University, 1960), 2.
2
Ibid., 1-2.
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previously mentioned, negotiated with the Russians. Buchanan
recognized the United States would benefit significantly from the
proposed treaty, but demonstrated to the representatives of the
imperial court the possible advantages for the Empire. The minister
indicated to the official of the court the necessity to expand trade in
the Russian Empire and of the potential to diversify their industry. In
spite of these proposed benefits, Nicholas I rejected the terms of the
agreement. Count Nesselrode, a supporter of the treaty, aided Minister
Buchanan in altering the disputed points of contention in said treaty.
On December 17, 1832, after the modifications to the agreement,
Minister Buchanan presented the Commercial and Navigation Treaty
to the appropriate diplomats. The following day, surprising Buchanan,
Nicholas I, “had signed the order that the treaty should be executed.
That afternoon Count Nesselrode and Buchanan met at the Foreign
Office and signed the treaty.” The Treaty of 1832 was ratified by
Imperial Russia on January 8, 1833, with the United States following
suit on April 8, 1833, and finalized with an exchange of ratifications
in Washington D.C. on May 11, 1833.3
Of particular interest is the fact that during the course of
negotiations of the thirteen articles discussed, only Article I did not
receive attention, nor was it emphasized by the imperial court of
Russia. Article I fundamentally altered the relationship between the
two countries. But why? Due to the significance that the article carries
we must consider the following statement verbatim.
There shall be between the territories of the high contracting
parties, a reciprocal liberty of commerce and navigation. The
inhabitants of the respective States shall, mutually have
3

Ned Herman Rubenstein, “The Abrogation of the 1832 Treaty of Navigation
and Commerce between the United States and Russia: Influence of a Minority
Group on International Affairs” (master’s thesis, University of Nebraska at Omaha,
1970), 1-3.
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liberty to enter ports, places and rivers of the territories of
each party, wherever foreign commerce is permitted. They
shall be at liberty to sojourn and reside in all parts
whatsoever of said territories, in order to attend to their
affairs and they shall enjoy, to that effect, the same security
and protection as natives of the country wherein they reside,
on condition of their submitting to the laws and ordinances
there prevailing and particularly to the regulations in force
concerning commerce.4
Article I did not have to be invoked until 1865, when Russia
began to detain Jewish Americans travelling in the country. In 1864
Bernard Bernstein, a former Jewish Russian who became a citizen of
the United States, visited his family in Poland. During his time in
Poland, Bernstein was incarcerated by the Russian police “for evading
his military obligations.” Subsequently, after much deliberation
between the United States Minister and Imperial Russia, Bernstein
was released, perhaps only because of his American citizenship.5
Further issues soon arose and the tipping point appears to have
occurred in mid-1880, when officials in St. Petersburg tried to deport
Jewish businessman Henry Pinkos. The United States embassy, upon
hearing of the plight of Pinkos, secured an extension for the
businessman, but eventually St. Petersburg ordered Pinkos and his
family out of the capital. This occurred despite Pinkos not completing
his business. Upon boarding, officials requested Pinkos’ passport,
however, Pinkos had placed his identification in his checked baggage.
4

National Archives United States (NAUS), RG59, Records of the Department
of State relating to Political Relations between the United States and Russia
(M5144), reel 6, 711.612/56. The author of this document is unknown due to
illegible signature/initials, but was written to the Department of State on November
25, 1911.
5
Rubenstein, “The Abrogation of the 1832 Treaty of Navigation and
Commerce,” 10-11.
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Unable to provide the appropriate documentation on the spot officials
sent Pinkos to prison.6 After much deliberation between Russia and
the United States, St. Petersburg released Pinkos, and allowed him to
return to the United States. The importance of this particular incident
is the interpretation of Article I by Secretary of State Evarts, who
“established the policy that the privileges accorded by the Treaty
applied to all alike without regard to the religious body to which they
belonged,” however, the “Russian officials [who] viewed the matter,
foreigners of any particular creed had only the same privileges as
were enjoyed by Russian subjects of the same creed.”7 Imperative to
the argument are a couple of points that did not garner the necessary
attention by the diplomats of the imperial court and the United States.
Given that the rise of anti-Semitism is much too broad of a
subject to discuss, herein we will concern ourselves with the issues
that arose between the United States and Imperial Russia. First we
should consider laws existing before, and immediately after, the
signing of the Treaty of 1832. In 1824, a law stipulated that, “all
foreign Jews, regardless of their citizenship, even into places where
Russian Jews are admitted, as well as the entry into Russia of Russian
Jews who repudiated their country, is prohibited.”8 This is of interest
when one takes into consideration the ongoing negotiations soon
thereafter. Furthermore, “in accordance with Russian Legislation of
1835 and 1839 it will be seen that certain categories of foreign Jews
were allowed residence in Russia.”9 Yet these matters appear to have
gone unnoticed by the United States and the Russian Empire at the
time, which more than likely contributed to a rise in tensions between
6

Schottenstein, “The Abrogation of the Treaty of 1832 between the United
States and Russia,” 8-9.
7
Rubenstein, “The Abrogation of the 1832 Treaty of Navigation and
Commerce,” 24.
8
NAUS, RG59, M5144, reel 6, 711.612/78, Dispatch Translation of Rossiya,
Curtis Guild to the Secretary of State, December 14, 1911, 3.
9
Ibid., 3.
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the two countries once the issue of Jewish faith became apparent to
the United States several decades later.
Hostilities toward the Jewish population grew with the
assassination of Alexander II by revolutionaries, of whom one was
Jewish, and contributed to an increase of anti-Semitism in the
imperial court. Alexander III further exacerbated hostilities due to his
anti-Semitic stance, as did his Minister of the Interior Nicolas
Ignatiev, who permitted pogroms and initiated legislation against the
Jewish population of Russia, thus leading to increased immigration of
Jews outside of the empire.10 The Russian Empire additionally
believed that “American Jews are divided into two classes: 1) those
who were formerly Russian subjects, and 2) all the others … if a
Russian subject becomes the subject of another country without
soliciting the permission of the Russian government, he is (according
to Russian law) still considered a Russian subject.”11 The role of the
Jewish population in the Revolution of 1905 further increased
tensions in the imperial court and in the western border regions of the
empire along the borders of, “the Kingdom of Poland where they
constituted a large number of organized workingmen.”12 The
Kishinev massacre also further demonstrates the growth of the antiSemitism.13 These conflicts contributed to the rise of discontent of

10

Rubenstein, “The Abrogation of the 1832 Treaty of Navigation and
Commerce,” 5.
11
NAUS, RG59, reel 6 711.612/87, “Abrogations of the Treaty of 1832,”
General Consul John H. Snodgrass to the Secretary of State, December 30, 1911,
Echoes in the English and American Press, Russko Slovo. General Consul
Snodgrass, in this dispatch 711.612/87, complied and translated twenty eight
newspapers.
12
Rubenstein, “The Abrogation of the 1832 Treaty of Navigation and
Commerce,” 6-7.
13
NAUS, RG59, M5144, reel 6, 711.612/87, “Abrogation of the Treaty of
1832,” Snodgrass to the Secretary of State, December 30, 1911, Russkia Vedomosti.
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Jewish Americans and subsequently led them to encourage the United
States government to abrogate the Treaty of 1832.
Yet despite these issues between the Russian Empire and the
United States, trade flourished and by 1910 the United States exported
more than $78.5 million worth of merchandise to Imperial Russia.
This was largely comprised of $50 million in cotton and
approximately $11 million in agricultural machinery, whereas the
United States imported only $14.9 million worth of goods from
Russia.14 In spite of the highly successful trade agreement, by 1911
the House of Representatives passed a decree, by a margin of three
hundred votes to one, to abrogate the Treaty of 1832.15 Curtis Guild
delivered the decision that the United States had rescinded the treaty
to Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergei D. Sazanov.16
Russia for Russians: The Russian Nationalist Party
The response in Imperial Russian was varied. For the purposes of
this article the reply of the Russian Nationalists will be explored. First
we must begin with the respective origins of the Russian Nationalist
Party and its constituency, which profoundly affected their decisionmaking. With the legalization of political parties, after the Revolution
of 1905, a group of noblemen from the western border region of
Imperial Russia formed the Russian Nationalist Party in 1909. The
landed nobility in the region held the perception that a class-based
society greatly threatened their livelihood, “which had always

14

NAUS, RG59, M5144, reel 6 711.612/87, “Abrogations of the Treaty of
1832,” General Consul John H. Snodgrass to the Secretary of State, December 30,
1911 , Echoes in the English and American Press, 3.
15
NAUS, RG59, M5144, reel 6 711.612/87, “Abrogations of the Treaty of
1832,” General Consul John H. Snodgrass to the Secretary of State, December 30,
1911, At Last, “Novoye Vremia.”
16
Rubenstein, “The Abrogation of the 1832 Treaty of Navigation and
Commerce,” 1.
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justified its dominance in terms of status rather than class.”17 As the
industrial revolution came to Russia the noblemen of the region
increased their profits in agriculture. This group recognized that rather
than earning meager pay from renting the land to peasants, “owning
an estate now meant owning a source of income.”18 The Russian
Nationalist Party’s primary constituency, the gentry, could be found
in the western border regions as well, as the area “was highly fertile
… with extensive commercial agriculture,”19 eventually providing a
strong political base.
Originally the constituency of the Russian Nationalist Party
supported the autocracy, however, due to the industrialization of the
country that threatened the landed nobility’s existence the tsar began
to lose the support of party members. Policies enacted by the Minister
of Finance Sergei Witte for the development of industry in Russia
“disadvantaged the agrarian sector of the economy. All this distanced
the nobles from a state that had historically been their protector.”20
Furthermore, these articles of legislation essentially led the noblemen
to create a political party that represented their ideology to the tsar
and explains why they “feared industrialists and refused to cooperate
with them.”21 However, it is worth noting that this organization was,
“not so much a party of nationalism as a party of the dominant
Russian nationality in a multinational empire. They sought to achieve
the complete domination by the Russians within the empire.”22

17

Robert Edelman, Gentry Politics on the Eve of the Russian Revolution: The
Nationalist Party 1907-1917 (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University
Press, 1980), 3.
18
Ibid.
19
Ibid., 6.
20
Ibid., 3.
21
Ibid., 174.
22
Ibid., 10.
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Such a political statement is attributed to their region of origin
and constituency, but certainly does not justify the Nationalist Party’s
anti-Semitic stance. The landed nobility of the Russian Nationalist
Party was typically from the western border region of Imperial
Russia. The area was historically a Polish territory prior to 1794
where the “Polish nobles dominated landholding[s].” The control the
Polish held alienated the Russian noblemen, and exacerbated by the
peasantry, where the “Jews had extensive influence over urban
commerce.”23 After the failed Polish uprising in 1863, Russian
noblemen’s precarious living situation improved as a result of the
autocratic state. Despite these improvements, the Russian nobility still
had “competition on the land from Polish landlords and in the towns
from Jewish merchants.”24
This perceived threat continued despite the Polish and Jewish
populations being minorities in the area. The anti-Semitic stance held
by the Russian nobility is only further emphasized by the perception
that Jews had participated in the Revolution of 1905 and opposed the
tsar. Of particular interest is the Jewish participation in the
revolutionary activities in the western border region, “which roughly
corresponded to the territory of the Pale Settlement to which Jewish
residence was restricted.”25 Thus, “the nationalism of the west
Russian gentry was the product of their sense of inferiority and fear of
non-Russian national groups.”26 These beliefs, and the Nationalist
Party’s desire to only concern themselves with their constituency, led
them to voice the concerns of the “Russian landlords,” that “raised the
demand ‘Russia for Russians,” but “the Nationalist Party’s principles

23

Robert Edelman, “The Russian Nationalist Party and the Political Crisis of
1909,” Russian Review 34, no. 1 (1975): 25.
24
Ibid., 25-27.
25
Edleman, Gentry Politics on the Eve of the Russian Revolution, 50-51.
26
Ibid., 105.
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were nearly always consistent with the most basic pragmatic interests
of its constituents.”27 When considering the abovementioned we now
should be able to understand the following response by the Russian
nationalists to the United States.
According to the Russian nationalists, President Taft’s decision
to support Congress on the issue of abrogation originated from the
influence that Jewish Americans exerted in the United States
government. This response can be attributed to the Russian treatment
and policies toward Jewish Americans, as General Consul John H.
Snodgrass stated that President Taft personally opposed the
abrogation of the Treaty of 1832. Nonetheless, Jewish Americans at
this point began to demonstrate against treatment of American Jews in
Russia. Such a response is attributed to Russian policies toward
people of Jewish ancestry that stated, “No foreign Jews except
bankers, heads of important commercial houses, brokers’
representatives, clerks and agents of commercial houses are permitted
to enter Russia.”28 This further demonstrates the conflict with Article
I of the Treaty of 1832. Furthermore, in the eyes of Russian
nationalists such a verdict was due to “the congressmen” who
intended to “influence Russia’s domestic laws by threatening to
abrogate the treaty,”29 as “they [Jews] are strong on two positions,
financial and political.”30 Russian nationalists charged that President
Taft succumbed to “the public opinion of the Jewish population,
27

Ibid., 48.
NAUS, RG59, M5144, reel 6, 711.612/56, “Construction of Article I of
Treaty of 1832 with Russia,” the initials of author are illegible, but appear to be JHP
to the Secretary of State, November 25, 1911.
29
NAUS, RG59, M5144, reel 6 711.612/87, “Abrogation of the Treaty of
1832,” Snodgrass to the Secretary of State, December 30, 1911; At Last, “Novoye
Vremia.”
30
NAUS, RG59, M5144, reel 6 711.612/87, “Abrogations of the Treaty of
1832,” General Consul John H. Snodgrass to the Secretary of State, December 30,
1911, Messrs. Sulzer & Co., “Novoye Vremia.”
28
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which represents a very considerable and well united number of
electors…”31 The nationalists stated the presidential candidates were
placating the Jewish population, as the United States at this time was
preparing for the presidential election of 1912.
Additionally, the nationalists professed that Jewish Americans,
whom they saw as mostly former Russian subjects, had “the
pretended purpose … to give the American Jews the right to come to
Russia without any restrictions…"32 Ultimately, the nationalists’
support of legislation and laws that restricted the travels of Jews
revolved around their belief that “during the time of the Revolution
many Jews – socialists, anarchists, and revolutionists emigrated to
America.”33 Such a belief can be attributed to increased anti-Semitism
after the assassination of Alexander II. Thus, the nationalists believed
Jewish émigrés constituted a monumental threat to the stability of
Imperial Russia. Yet this provided an opportunity for the Russian
nationalists to propose their own legislation aimed at reducing the
United States’ importance in Russia. The Russian nationalists advised
the Duma to support the abrogation of the Treaty of 1832. The
nationalists declared in the newspaper Novoe Vremia, “instead of the
low duty, a higher duty will be charged on American goods. The
further growth of American trade in Russia will be impossible;
American goods will be displaced by England and Germany.”34

31

NAUS, RG59, M5144, reel 6 711.612/87, “Abrogations of the Treaty of
1832,” General Consul John H. Snodgrass to the Secretary of State, December 30,
1911, Echoes in the English and American Press, “Russkoe Slovo.”
32
NAUS, RG59, M5144, reel 6 711.612/87, “Abrogations of the Treaty of
1832,” General Consul John H. Snodgrass to the Secretary of State, December 30,
1911, Messrs. Sulzer & Co., “Novoye Vremia.”
33
NAUS, RG59, M5144, reel 6 711.612/87, “Abrogations of the Treaty of
1832,” General Consul John H. Snodgrass to the Secretary of State, December 30,
1911, Question About American Jews, “Russkoye Slovo.”
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Russian nationalists recognized the broad economic influence of
the United States in Russia. This led the nationalists to seek greater
economic freedom from the United States, particularly in the cotton
industry. At this time, Russia imported over 50 percent of its cotton,
of which up to 90 percent came from the North American republic.35
To dissuade the United States from exporting goods to Russia, and for
the Russian textile industry to not import cotton, the Nationalists
formally proposed a piece of legislation that would increase the duties
on American imported goods by 100 percent.36 The Russian
nationalists believed that Russian Turkestan in Central Asia could
provide the empire with the necessary supplies of cotton to maintain
the Russian textile industry. According to sources reported from the
Golos Moskvi the increase in cotton yields in Turkestan could
“release” not only Russia but also “the European cotton industry from
the American yoke.”37 From 1905 to 1909, exports to the United
States amounted to roughly $18,693,500 while Russia imported
$177,047,000 worth of goods. The Nationalists believed that the
34

NAUS, M5144, RG59, reel 6 711.612/87, “Abrogations of the Treaty of
1832,” General Consul John H. Snodgrass to the Secretary of State, December 30,
1911, At last, “Novoye Vremia.”
35
NAUS, M5144, RG59, reel 6 711.612/87, “Abrogations of the Treaty of
1832,” General Consul John H. Snodgrass to the Secretary of State, December 30,
1911, Imperial Russia at this point imported 10 million poods (a pood is equivalent
to 36.1127 pounds) of American cotton, which is indicated in the article A Hasty
Bill. Russia’s textile industry required 23 million poods and is discussed at length in
Shooting at One’s People. The figure of 90 percent is derived from the United
States exporting 10 million poods out of the 11.5 million Russia purportedly
imported. Although one must additionally consider figures in other newspapers in
Russia that state this range is from 8 to 10 million poods a year.
36
NAUS, M5114, RG59, reel 6 711.612/87, “Abrogations of the Treaty of
1832,” General Consul John H. Snodgrass to the Secretary of State, December 30,
1911, A Hasty Bill, “Commersant.”
37
NAUS, M5114, RG59, reel 6 711.612/87, “Abrogations of the Treaty of
1832,” General Consul John H. Snodgrass to the Secretary of State, December 30,
1911, Russian-American Trade, “Golos Moskvi.”
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United States would be the only negatively impacted party by the
nullification of the trade agreement, and it is not surprising that they
expressed such a sentiment, leading them to state that “the farmers of
the Great American Republic will be the first to feel all the
consequences of the political mistake of their representatives.”38 The
Nationalists sought to counterattack the United States Congress by
enforcing a sort of Russian economic sanction on the United States;
more or less a tariff war.
Despite this view, more cautious papers doubted the ability of
Turkestan to support the growing demand of the empire and stated the
Russian economy would falter greatly if the United States abolished
the contract. At this time the Russian textile industry necessitated
roughly 23 million poods of cotton to sustain production, and it was
estimated that the Turkestan cotton industry would not exceed more
than 10 to 13 million poods per year. Approximately 2,736 Russian
factories needed cotton, and employed close to 840,520 people,
roughly 43 percent of the entire workforce in Russia. Utro Rossii
stated that with the substantial increase of duty the cost of cotton
could hinder productivity, and if Russia did not import cotton from
the United States then it was surmised at least half of the textile
workers might become unemployed. This, in the opinion of the paper,
“cannot be considered anything else but a shot at one’s own
people.”39 The newspapers in Moscow and St. Petersburg detailed the
monumental increase of cotton production in Central Asia and
Turkestan. However, harvests did not approach the levels to support
the country as the nationalists hoped for, despite the development of
the cotton industry in Turkestan. They did not take into consideration
38

NAUS, M5114, RG59, reel 6 711.612/87, “Abrogations of the Treaty of
1832,” General Consul John H. Snodgrass to the Secretary of State, December 30,
1911, Golos Moskvi, “Russian-American Trade.”
39
NAUS, M5114, RG59, reel 6 711.612/87, “Abrogations of the Treaty of
1832,” General Consul John H. Snodgrass to the Secretary of State, December 30,
1911, Utro Rossii, “Shooting At One’s Own People.”
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the impact and the subsequent response by the people of Turkestan to
the modernization efforts in the region.
Modernization of the Cotton Industry in Turkestan
According to John Whitman cotton cultivation in Turkestan dates
to the time before the birth of Christ. To grow cotton in Central Asia
can be considered a time-consuming and laborious process, and as a
result the cultivation requirements revolved around the domestic
needs. Not until the eighteenth century did “trade relations, albeit on a
low level, were established with Russia on a fairly regular basis.”40
Yet Turkestan cotton did not appeal to the Russians because of its
high costs and low quality. To manufacture cotton the native
inhabitants, who held small family parcels of between two and two
and a half desiatinas (one desiatina equals 2.7 acres), cultivated the
land through traditional methods that “were primitive to an extreme
degree.”41 For instance, to till the soil farmers relied upon “an ancient
native implement which did not turn, but only loosened the soil …
since the cotton plant requires depth, three such plowings were
necessary.”42
Furthermore, the “native varieties were of short staple and their
bolls opened only partially, so the bolls were broken off the stem in
harvesting.”43 These production procedures contributed to a period of
almost two to three months to harvest one desiatina, plus the
transportation time from Tashkent to the Orenburg railhead amounted
to five to six months. Upon delivery it was not uncommon to see a 35
percent loss of cotton.44 Thus, to meet the needs of the textile industry
Russia relied on cotton from abroad, almost exclusively from the
40

John Whitman, “Turkestan Cotton in Imperial Russia,” American Slavic
and East European Review 15, no. 2 (1956): 190.
41
Ibid., 190.
42
Ibid., 191.
43
Ibid.
44
Ibid., 191-192.

18

William Cohoon
United States. During the American Civil War cotton exports were
severely limited and, “the growing importance of trade with Asia,”
coupled with this shortage of cotton from the United States “were
major factors leading to the Russian conquest of Turkestan in the
1860s.”45
The Russian occupation of Turkestan did not begin extensively
until the military campaign of 1863. Imperial Russia’s desire to
expand into Central Asia originated from a belief for a need to
“access markets, as well as support in any potential contest with Great
Britain.”46 The loss in the Crimean War had damaged Russian
prestige abroad and military leaders believed that the conquest of
Central Asia could perhaps alter such a perception. However, there
was not a coherent plan by the imperial court, as most wished to avoid
a conflict with the British. Yet strong-willed military leaders pressed
on in Central Asia and by 1866 Alexander II “signed an official
decree of annexation.”47 General Konstantin Petrovich fon Kaufman
was appointed governor of the region, and arrived in Tashkent in
1867. Kaufman “envisioned the city as the embodiment of a new
civilization,” and further, “believed … Russian [influence] … would
transform Turkestan into a productive and progressive tsarist
province.”48 Subsequently, Governor-General Kaufman developed a
plan to increase the cotton yields in Turkestan.
In the early 1870s the governor ordered two experts on cotton to
the United States to study the various varieties in use in order to find a
more suitable seed for Turkestan. Upon their return, the specialists
provided two options of cotton strains: Sea Island and Upland. Further
efforts with the Sea Island variety proved that this strain could not be
45

David Pretty, “The Cotton Industry in Russia and the Soviet Union,”
National overview and the USSR, Textile conference IISH, Nov. 11-13, 2004, 13.
46
Jeff Sahadeo, Russian Colonial Society in Tashkent, 1865-1923
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2007), 19.
47
Ibid., 19-21.
48
Ibid., 32.
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used in the region, due to the aridity of Central Asia. Using the
Upland class, the Russian Imperial court created posts that specialized
in growing seedlings to be delivered to cultivators in the area. What
became known as the Emperor’s Plantation, located in Merv,
established itself as the eminent farmstead in the region. Here local
inhabitants could purchase, or rent, agricultural equipment and learn
new techniques in native dialects or Russian. The plantation provided
seedlings at an affordable cost to agriculturalists. As a result, by 1884
close to three hundred desiatinas grew the American strain, and by
1889 44,500, “or 52 percent of the total sown area.”49 The native
strain was essentially nonexistent by the beginning of the twentieth
century.50
According to Imperial Russia the expansion of the cotton harvest
in the region was attributed to “the extremely favourable economic
conditions, the Russian government having helped its cultivation both
by the imposition of a high tariff on imported cotton and by the
reduction of the land tax.”51 To further stimulate the cultivation of
cotton in Turkestan, in 1900, Russia offered tax incentives. Typically
tax on a property was 10 percent of the “expected” harvest. However,
if one cultivated cotton the tax on the speculated yield was lower.
This occurred despite the fact that grains generally “produced 4-5
times as much income.”52 This tax incentive was applicable only to
those who grew the American strain of cotton.53
The Russian Empire advanced modernization in the area through
the construction of railroads, the Trans-Caspian and Orenburg
Railways. In 1896, the Trans-Caspian Railroad connected with
49

Whitman, “Turkestan Cotton in Imperial Russia,” 194.
Ibid., 194-195.
51
Nikolay Ivanovich Malahowski, “Russian Turkestan and Its
Products,”Journal of Finance and Trade and Industry Gazette (St. Petersburg,
1910), 5.
52
Whitman, “Turkestan Cotton in Imperial Russia,” 199.
53
Ibid.
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Tashkent, which aided in increasing the sown area of cotton in the
region. From 1898 to 1900, it is estimated that land under cultivation
increased by 54 percent. Similarly, upon completion of the Orenburg
section, the region experienced growth from between 200 thousand
desiatinas to 423 thousand before the outbreak of World War I.54 In
the early 1850s Turkestan supplied Russia with close to 52 thousand
poods of cotton, less than 5 percent of all imports; however, exports
slightly surpassed 14 million poods in 1915 with a total 524 thousand
sown desiatinas.55 This total was the highest yield the area
experienced, and would not be attained again until the 1920s. These
events contributed to the unprecedented yields that Russian
nationalists believed would sustain the Russian textile industry and
permit economic independence from the United States. Turkestan,
however, experienced many issues that hindered the ability of Russia
to maximize the region’s capabilities to its fullest potential in order to
produce affordably priced cotton for industrialists.
The Reality of Modernization Efforts in Turkestan
This examination of the Russian effort to modernize Turkestan
reveals what may be seen by Western scholars as an ambiguous
approach to implement consistent reforms to develop the region.
Nonetheless, it is imperative to note the difficulties encountered by
Imperial Russia while modernizing the territory. Central Asia’s
climate must first be considered when focusing on the issues that
contributed to inefficient means of production. According to the
Imperial Russian research, “at this time Turkestan enjoys a far greater
number of cloudless days than any other part of the Empire and in that
respect resembles that of Cairo,” although, it is further noted, “the
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rainfall, however, being insufficient, artificial irrigation is used.”56
Irrigation of Turkestan proved to be complicated endeavor for
Imperial Russia. Several accounts throughout the development of the
region attest to the dryness and the lack of water sources in the region,
or comment on the ineffective measures implemented for the
construction of canals. During his trip in the 1870s, Eugene Schuyler
had this to say about a project in the area: “There is a project at
Tashkent to irrigate this steppe by the construction of a large canal
from the Syr Darya above Hodjent … still no careful survey has been
made, and it is declared by many that such a canal is impossible, and
that all money spent before as survey is made is simply thrown away.
The work on the canal has, however, already begun.”57 Schuyler also
described the area as “a parched and barren waste, although at one or
two places there are wells and cisterns of brackish and unpleasant
water. 58
General Kaufman attempted to address the issue of expanding the
canals of Turkestan by requesting a geographical survey of the
Golodnaya Steppe in 1869. In 1870, Baron Aminov reported, “the
Golodnaya Steppe sloped toward the Syr Darya and the Aral Sea and
suggested that the Zaravshan River would be more
suitable…However, the Zaravshan…lacked volume and uniformity of
flow, and the planners had little choice but to proceed with the
irrigation of the Golodnaya Steppe by bringing water from the Syr
Darya.”59 Subsequently, a military engineer presented a design
to irrigate 200,000 desiatinas, where construction of the
waterway began in
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1872, but was abandoned by 1879. Construction of the channels can
at best be described as tedious and laborious. Russian officials forced
unpaid native rural laborers to build the canals, thus alienating the
populace of the region, who named the project “Tonghiz Ariq, or pig
canal … The worst possible insult from a Muslim.”60 Future attempts
to irrigate the region met similar with failures due to the high cost of
construction, inability to purchase land from the native population,
horrible working conditions that alienated the labor force, and
ineffective machinery. All of which contributed greatly to the
inefficiency of development. Foreign investors made offers to aid
Imperial Russia; however officials declined the proposals.61
During the construction of the canals, Russian officials forced the
inhabitants to work without pay and in poor working conditions, thus
eliciting a negative reaction. Not only did the undesirable
environment contribute to an unwilling labor unit, but representatives
of the imperial court could not implement an educational plan to
demonstrate new techniques in irrigation to the workforce. Count
K.K. Pahlen, during his tenure in the region as the head of the
Senatorial Investigation of Turkestan, noted the following: “I
examined many plans for terracing the fields, for improved drainage
and water conservation, but all would have necessitated a prolonged
period for the reeducation of the population and the abandonment of
old established technique, while the novel methods introduced by the
Russian engineers had so far yielded very meager results.”62
Additionally, Count Pahlen stated that the lack of a proper university
in Russia at the time where one may learn horticulture contributed to
the ineffective training. This resulted in many “former railway and
mining engineers who had learnt science or irrigation in situ, or, at
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best, men with a technical education at a secondary school level”
becoming engineers of the irrigation projects. The Count added,
“under these conditions mistakes and failures were unavoidable.”63
Administrative difficulties included an oversight of the seedling
plantations set up to aid the expansion of the American strain of
cotton at a low cost. Although relatively successful due to the
affordable cost of the seedlings, the farmsteads set up to sell, and or
rent agricultural machinery proved to be a failure. Russian officials
did not take into consideration the poverty of the Turkestan
population. In addition to this the Russian administrators did not
understand the traditional landholdings of the peasants. Many of the
people who held land possessed small parcels, and for those who had
larger estates they typically used the property for animal husbandry.
This severely limited the incorporation of modern equipment to
improve the process of cultivation and rendered the equipment of
little value its owners. The shortage of Russian agricultural specialists
in the region provided by the Agriculture Department exacerbated the
situation. For example, in 1911 there were only three or four such
professionals that resided in Turkestan, all of whom did not specialize
in cotton.64
The oversight of land rights proved to be problematic. For
instance, “in 1873 local Russian officials worked out a measure, and
soon thereafter secured its application, transferring title to all
Turkestan lands to the Russian state.”65 Officials believed had they
not pursued such a course with the indigenous people, Imperial Russia
would have appeared weak, and had the natives retained their
property they would more than likely have refused to sell the land to
the Russians. However, this was designed “to break up the power of
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the local aristocracy and the secular strength of the Moslem clergy.”66
Ultimately this movement wound down, but the misstep proved that
officials did not understand that the “Turkestan peasant had a
different attitude toward his land than his Russian counterpart.”67 The
peasants of Turkestan invested significant amounts of labor to
maintain their parcel, and as a result of owning only several desiatinas
the family often invested their efforts into cultivating crops that
reaped a larger profit, thus creating a stronger bond with their
property.68 Nonetheless, not only did Russian officials not
comprehend the magnitude of native affinity for their land, but
business ventures in the region sought to exploit this economically, as
well.
Count Pahlen’s seminal piece on his tenure investigating the
corruption in Russian Turkestan provides a valuable first person
account of such dealings by the private sector in the region. Pahlen
noted many creditors offered to purchase cotton and corn from the
local agriculturalists, and he further detailed how this contributed to
the widespread cultivation of the crop.69 John Whitman provides
greater detail about the consequences in such matters. Creditors
exploited the recent Russian policy of permitting private industry in
the region. Here the firms, “organized staffs of agents to buy cotton
against future delivery with cash advances to the peasants.”70
Naturally, farmers in Turkestan agreed to such an endeavor as they
used more of their land for the cultivation of cotton as a result of the
price paid for the strain of cotton from the United States. Farmers did
so despite an interest rate that often approached 60 percent.71
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Agrarians put their parcel of land up as the collateral for the
advance and frequently defaulted when they did not generate a high
enough yield at harvest time. Furthermore, with the modernization of
ginning, working with a plethora of natives became cumbersome and
caused firms to deal less frequently with native farmers. These factors
contributed to “200,000 landless agricultural workers.”72 Eventually,
this led Count Pahlen to explicitly explain the potential threat this had
to the overall livelihood of Turkestan, as many farmers stopped
producing grains in order to earn more money through creditors. By
this point Pahlen stated, “There arose a shortage of corn, and
subsequently of bread, which in this region had been ridiculously
cheap … At about this time, too, the banks ceased to be interested in
cotton as before…”73 Exacerbating the discontent amongst the
populace is additionally seen with the introduction of the railroad, as,
“in a word the construction of the railway means the absolute and
final russification of the middle zone of Central Asia.”74 Contributing
further to the discontent of the people of Turkestan was the
construction of the railway.
Officials of the imperial court, and in particular General
Kaufman, believed the railway would “transform Turkestan into a
productive and progressive tsarist province”75 which it undeniably
did, but at what cost? First and foremost, the railway created and
reinforced an imperial identity. For instance, to commemorate the
opening of the railroad stations along the route of the Trans-Caspian,
officials of the Russian Empire played “military music,” consequently
in response to this: “Turkoman women and children began to raise
loud cries of lamentation, while the men threw themselves on the
72
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ground with their foreheads in the dust.”76 The memory of the loss to
Russia proved too much to bear for the native inhabitants of the
region. To build the Trans-Caspian and Orenburg Railroads, cheap
Central Asian labor became the norm. Yet a fear arose that too many
local natives employed to construct the railway would be dangerous,
so the Imperial Russia employed a vast amount of Russian labor that,
in turn, replaced the locals. By the time of completion of the
Orenburg section there were 5,094 employed Russians, and only 948
natives. Additional issues occurred as a result of wage differences, as
the locals received a fraction of what Russian garnered. Both sides
frequently did not receive their wages. This led to confrontations
between the two groups and incited the growth of the Turkestan
intelligentsia, who, after the 1905 Revolution, began to use the press
to advance the ideas of nationalism amongst the native populace and
the discrepancies between them.77
Although Turkestan experienced strikes prior to 1905, after the
revolution protests occurred more frequently. This can be attributed,
once again, to the railway. The Russian Empire permitted strikes after
the 1905 Revolution and one can see a significant growth in protest to
less than satisfactory work conditions. Beginning in 1895 and until
the revolution, “there had been 270 strikes at cotton factories with
197,139 participants who left work for a total of 945,686 worker
hours.” Consequently, “in 1905, just in the cotton textile industry,
there were 1,008 strikes, 784,058 strikers, and 8,329,352 worker
hours lost.”78 The numbers rose once again by 1912 when, “one
hundred thirty-five thousand cotton workers would go on strike …
76
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followed by 180 thousand in 1913; during the first half of 1914, 233
thousand cotton workers struck for a total of over two million worker
hours lost, a greater total in six months than in any year except
1905.”79 These measures for the modernization of Central Asia
undoubtedly contributed to the growth of self-awareness in the
inhabitants of Turkestan, and surely influenced the ability to harvest
cotton. In spite of the monumental growth of the Turkestan cotton
industry, “Central Asian cotton was [still] 50 percent more expensive
in Moscow in 1913 than American cotton on sale in St. Petersburg.”80
Conclusion: The Russian Nationalists’ Miscalculation
When taking into consideration the events that occurred in
Turkestan from the 1870s until the 1890s the region’s significant
growth in cotton production is impressive. However, these procedures
hindered the ability to maximize the harvest in the area and ultimately
the rise in production perhaps had more to do with the total sown area
for cotton. For instance, it was noted that the total cultivated area of
Turkestan far surpassed the sown area of the United States. Perhaps
the Russian nationalists focused on the production of 1907 where the
region produced slightly over 9 million poods. This is a remarkable
increase from the 1899 figure of 2.2 million poods.81 What may have
contributed to the beliefs of the Russian Nationalist Party is that in
1909, the year the party formed, Turkestan had 300,000 desiatinas82
under cultivation that yielded almost 11 million poods. By 1911 the
region had 377,000 desiatinas dedicated to cotton; this produced just
over 13 million poods, which constituted close to 50 percent of the
Russian textile industry’s needs.83 However, at its peak in 1915
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Turkestan produced 14 million poods of cotton on 524,000 desiatinas,
of the necessary 23 million needed to sustain the textile industry.84
The increase in cotton yields also coincides with the rise in sown area.
Thus, it demonstrates that the growth of the harvest relied
significantly on the expansion of cultivated land.
This increase in production, and in sown area, surely contributed
to the nationalists’ declaration that “the production of cotton in
Turkestan is increasing and has reached such dimensions that Russia
will not be in need of American cotton in the very near future.”85 The
Russian nationalists must not have taken into consideration the impact
of events of the late nineteenth century on the people of Central Asia,
nor the approach at implementing policy to maximize the potential of
the region. Nevertheless, production never approached the amount the
Russian nationalists needed to create a ‘Russia for Russians’ and
economic independence. Additionally, the Russian nationalist desire
for economic self-sufficiency and confrontation with the United
States appears to conflict with the idea proposed by Robert Edelman,
who stated, “the Nationalists were not especially concerned with
deflecting attention from internal antagonisms by focusing on external
enemies,” and “the Russian Nationalist Party approached international
politics with surprising confusion and silence.”86
Yet further studies are warranted on their involvement in the
attempt to gain financial autonomy from the United States and their
involvement in international dealings. Additional work must also
address the view of where Turkestan stood in the grand scheme of a
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Russia for Russians, particularly when one considers the nationalists’
perceptions of the financial wellbeing of Jews in the western
borderlands and that the noblemen were agriculturalists. Was the
region to be incorporated as a part of the empire, or to be considered
an autonomous region that fed the Russian textile industry? The
answers to such questions will only aid the scholarship of the Russian
nationalists and their wish of economic liberation from the United
States.
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